'Military strategist and conflict\r'

' papist versus chivalrous Armies\r\n comparison roman and Medieval Anglo-Saxon armies posit received novel challenges due to evolutionary changes in phalanx techniques and strategy and the huge sequence gap of round two thousand years that separated them. For the urinate of study here, we will take into account the multitude strategy and style deployed by roman type armies of two hundred BC, at a time when they constituted most overwhelming military force in the present-day(a) world and compare them with strategy, styles, techniques make use ofd by thirteenth snow Medieval armies of England, France and Saxony.\r\nThe roman type military strategies of strugglefare were based on traditions and experience that ran since more(prenominal) than five hundred years, evolved through with(predicate) countless campaigns and wars. Their beginning was humble, in name of a local armed tribe primp to protect its geographical entity. However, over next centuries they acquired as they acquired skills and experience, they molded themselves in a massive unbeatable ground forces that was reputed even among its enemies for its technical superiority and tenacity.\r\n forces layout: papistical host presented a fully gradable structure, like a modern day military, placid of various units and sub-units. Legions marked the largest and funda mental mass units of military with their strength totaling around 6000 men. Each legion was divided in cohorts  that were further subdivided in smaller units of maniples and centuries that comp deck upd mavin hundred soldiers on average. The legions stationed at front contained exclusively doughy metrical foot, comprising best and most skilled soldiers of the military. On some(prenominal) campaign the ground forces travel through its legions and for each one of them were responsible for marching, encampment, logistics, and vigilance according to set standards of the army.\r\n state of war strategy: papisticals u sed numerous innovative and remarkable models within the scope of their conventional model of conducting warfare in triple ducts. Hastati formed the first rank, situated closest to enemy line of descents, principes formed second line and triarii was the last rank that was typically kept as specialist reserved force. The army structure at trothfields was remarkably ordered, with frontline and rear units regularly hardened in a way so as to come out no gap in the ranks. The three line system of Roman army provided it crucial maneuvering space, gave it astuteness and allowed it to bear initial losses to overcome them in later phase of dispute.\r\n war tactics: The au hencetic combat involved hand to hand interlockings, reversal battles and use of war machinery that threw arrows, stones and fireballs as missiles to enemy army lines. Usually the attack was initiated by Roman war machines where they barraged d opposing army with arrows, spears, and plodding stones. posterio r to this, heavy infantry was first unit to assume main battle foray and engaged electrical resistance soldiers through hand to hand combat. As struggle units were progressively injured and worn out, they withdrew back into the electric shock of three tier structure and they were replaced by orthogonal units to continue battle. sawbuck was largely used for ornamental warfare, were limited in number and did not take extensive partake in warfare.\r\nLogistics: Supplying the army with aliment and other needs was a major(ip) challenge for Roman generals, specially on their wide campaigns and given the fact that food production and methods of supplies were genuinely nominal in ancient times. Therefore Roman troops carried most of equipment, including their lodging, clothing on wight carts. Their efficient network meanwhile ensured continued supplies of food and fuel to keep army moving.\r\nCompared to ancient Roman military system, the medieval warfare presents significant con trasts, oddly in terms of military deployment, strategy and battle tactics. Use of gunpowder and missile technology place the greatest departure from conventional and largely manual methods of conducting war. The rise of pillage warfare, where armies of one state pillaged and pillaged other states for purpose of supplies led rise to fortification and siege warfare\r\nArmy Layout: Medieval army layout deployed long range heavy and cleared canons in the front line, supported by archers and heavy buck that formed main mass of army. Cavalry formed the main fighting force of the army, that comprised men mounted on horses, ready to give rase to enemy flanks. Knights, mounted soldiers with special military cookery formed an important part of cavalry ranks.\r\nWarfare Tactics: Medieval warfare tactics use extensive use of canons and, towards later age, use of guns to undertake the first volley of assault. This was followed by charge of cavalry units. Use of horses had given lighte ning striking potentials to European armies and they used this advantage to launch rapid waves of attacks. In the medieval warfare, role of infantry had been relatively marginalized and their flower purpose was to act as support units at times of large scale siege and inundation of enemy fortification\r\nBattle of Cannae\r\nBattle of Cannae is considered one of most important ancient military events that is chill out widely studied and taught in military schools. The battle was part of second Punic war, and it was fought under perfidious Hannibal against the might of Roman Empire in 216 century BC. The Roman army was numerically much more superior and had better terrain than army of Hannibal and had enough time to prepare for the oncoming battle. Yet, Hannibal successfully overwhelmed the opposition and hand one of most comprehensive de travail to Roman army in its heydays.\r\nThe combined Roman and perfidious forces combating in battle exceeded 1,40,000: Romans at near 850000, and Carthaginian forces totaling 55000. On the day of battle, Roman generals arranged their army in traditional three rank structure, with infantry placed in center and cavalry placed at side flanks to provide cover. The arrangement displayed traditional Roman affinity for depth, and they planned to use their deployment to pass over through center of Hannibal’s forces.  However, the fact that Roman generals had opted for depth, rather than width meant that both armies same frontlet appearance, negating the visual aspect of Roman numerical strength. The armies of Hannibal were in any case at apparent disadvantage with Aufidus River cutting finish up their chances of Retreat.\r\nThe entire strategy of Roman generals was based on their previous experience of skirmishes and combats with Hannibal, whom they knew to be a resourceful, and slyness tactician. Hannibal was also ware of weaknesses of his army and the fact that both armies were meeting in open battlefield did not provide him to plan for any possible still-hunt or surprise maneuver. But Hannibal was also swell up aware of strengths and weaknesses of his different units and he deployed them strategically at flanks to make their best use.\r\nThe Roman army moved forward en masse while Hannibal lengthened his army in line formation providing great flexibility and inner causal agent within army flanks.Hannibal used his superior cavalry to defeat and raise behind inferior Roman cavalry and then outflank them to attack Roman rear. The pincer movement created panic in Roman flanks and their front lines started to blow over on back lines where Carthaginian cavaliers eliminated them. This caused the rear lines to get towards center, creating massive confusion among Roman soldiers.\r\nThe combined Roman push towards their own center allowed created a stance where they got extremely densely packed, not even leave them sufficient them to reform, regroup or maneuver their weapons. interim Cartha ginian army had completely encircled Roman forces, and started cutting them down to virtually last man. The battle is still recounted as one with highest number of causalities in a single day.\r\nA number of factors contributed to conquest of Hannibal, including his superior analysis of situation and his clever use of cavalry and infantry. Hannibal converted the disadvantage of having a river at back to advantage in pushing forwards his forces with full knowledge that Romans could not at to the lowest degree outflank his infantry. Meanwhile, Roman army could retreat through only its left flank, its other retreating chances cut shoot by Mountains at one side and River at other. Ultimately Romans were left with no chance to move and Hannibal accomplished one of the greatest military feat in history.\r\nReference\r\nRichard A. Gabriel. Donald W. Boose Jr.1994.  The Great Battles of Antiquity: A Strategic and Tactical Guide to Great Battles That determine the Development of War. Greenwood Press. Westport, CT.\r\nJohn France. 1999. Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000-1300.  . UCL Press. London.\r\nRichard A. Preston, Sydney F. Wise, Herman O. Werner. 1956. History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society. Frederick A. Praeger.: saucily York.\r\nRoger Beaumont . 1994. War, Chaos and History. Praeger. Place of Publication: Westport, CT.\r\n'